You will not hear this part of the agreement (or any part of the text) quoted by those who say that the Belfast Convention Protection Protocol is necessary. This is because their argument is driven by an ideological assumption that Northern Ireland`s ties with Great Britain must be gradually eroded and that it must constantly move towards political absorption by the Republic. The overall result of these problems was to undermine trade unionists` confidence in the agreement exploited by the anti-DUP agreement, which eventually overtook the pro-agreement Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in the 2003 general elections. UUP had already resigned from the executive in 2002 following the Stormontgate scandal, in which three men were indicted for intelligence gathering. These charges were eventually dropped in 2005 because persecution was not „in the public interest.“ Immediately afterwards, one of Sinn Féin`s members, Denis Donaldson, was unmasked as a British agent. Less is mentioned is the support given by President George W. Bush`s administration to the „peace dividend“ in the crucial years following the agreement. Richard Haas, appointed emissary by Bush, was active during this period for the dismantling of arms and then returned to Northern Ireland to lead cross-party discussions on the unresolved issues of the peace process. The vague wording of some so-called „constructive ambiguities“ helped ensure the adoption of the agreement and delayed debate on some of the most controversial issues. These include extra-military dismantling, police reform and the standardisation of Northern Ireland.
The agreement called for the creation of an independent commission to review police rules in Northern Ireland, „including ways to promote broad community support“ for these agreements. The UK government has also pledged to carry out a „large-scale review“ of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. But U.S. spokeswoman Nancy Pelosi said there was „no chance“ that a trade deal between Britain and the United States would go through the U.S. Congress if Britain violated international agreements, undermining the Good Friday agreement. Northern Ireland political parties that approved the agreement were also invited to consider the creation of an independent advisory forum, which would represent civil society, with members with expertise on social, cultural, economic and other issues, and would be appointed by both administrations. In 2002, a framework structure was agreed for the North-South Advisory Forum, and in 2006 the Northern Ireland Executive agreed to support its implementation. During negotiations on the withdrawal agreement, some said that a hard border between NI and the Republic of Ireland would violate the Good Friday agreement.