The growing importance of CAD is reflected in the controversy they sometimes generate. In 1998, the Slovenian Prime Minister faced impeachment proceedings with Israel for a DCA. Footnote 2 An agreement between Belarus and Iran in 2007 provoked public condemnation from the United States and the European Union. Footnote 3 A 1996 DCA between Greece and Armenia led a Turkish government spokesman to accuse Greece of „threatening peace and stability in the region“ and of trying to „surround Turkey“. Footnote 4 And a 1995 agreement between Australia and Indonesia proved so controversial that it was not denounced until four years later. Footnote 5 The complex defence relationship between Japan and South Korea, with the United States as K negotiators, illustrates this logic. Footnote 100 A Japanese military analyst said: „Japan and South Korea are currently cooperating indirectly through the United States. If the two nations cooperate directly, it would reduce the burden on the United States. Footnote 101 For example, a direct Japanese-Korean DCA would allow Japan`s signal intelligence to complement South Korea`s vast human intelligence and ultimately improve the ability of the three governments to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat.

U.S. analysts and defense officials agree that all parties would benefit from the „triangle completion.“ Footnote 102 But an agreement remains elusive, almost exclusively because of the persistent mistrust. As a result, the United States acted as an „honest broker“ and adopted numerous confidence-building measures, including footnote 103, including secondary talks at multilateral events, the annual trilateral defence conference and small „Tabletop“ exercises, as well as interim extensions on interoperability, logistics and procurement. Footnote 104 The success of these actions depends on the ability of the mediator to credibly inform each party of the reliability of the others. Second, differences in the scope of DCAs raise questions of institutional organization. In some cases, states have a single general defence framework in place. In other cases, states assemble several DIACs in pieces. What explains the choice between these two options? Institutional design concerns penetrating DCAs, including the length of the contract, the ease of termination, the prospects for renewal and, of course, the scope of application.